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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal from a judgment of 
the District Juvenile Court for Weber County, State of 
Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable L. Roland Anderson, Judge of the 
District Juvenile Court, Weber County, State of Utah, 
granted appellant's motion for issuance of a certificate 
to secure the attendance of a nonresident witness, but 
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2 
denied that portion of the motion pertaining to payment 
of fees by the State of Utah or its subdivisions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court's 
order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent will stipulate to appellant's statement 
of facts as being generally correct. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE RIGHT OF A DEFENDANT TO SE-
CURE A WITNESS AT STATE EXPENSE 
THROUGH THE "UNIFORM ACT TO SE-
CURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES 
FROM WITHOUT A STATE IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS" IS NOT A B S O L U T E ; 
RATHER, IT IS DISCRETIONARY WITH 
THE TRIAL COURT. 
The earlier cases which construed the "Uniform Act 
to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a 
State in Criminal Proceedings," Utah Code Ann. § 77-
45-11 et seq. (1953), as amended, (hereinafter "Uniform 
Act"), denied the obligation of the State to procure de-
fense witnesses at state expense: 
" . . . it is clear that this statute, providing 
as it does, that specified sums for fees and mile-
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age shall be paid or tendered to nonresident 
witnesses summoned to attend and testify in 
criminal prosecutions in this state, but not pro-
viding, either expressly or by implication, that 
such witnesses summoned on behalf of the de-
fendant shall be brought in without expense to 
him, does not confer upon the courts of this 
state authority to procure the attendance and 
testimony of witnesses from without the state 
for the defendant in any case at the expense of 
the public." State v. Fouquette, 67 Nev. 505, 221 
P. 2d 404 (1950), cert, denied, 71 S. Ct. 799, 341 
U. S. 932, 95 L. Ed. 1361. 
See also State v. Swenson, 243 Minn. 24, 66 N. W. 2d 1 
(1954); State v. Blount, 200 Or. 35, 264 P. 2d 419 (1954), 
cert, denied, 74 S. Ct. 711, 347 U. S. 962, 98 L. Ed. 1105. 
Since those decisions, federal constitutional standards 
have been refined to the point where as a matter of due 
process of law an indigent defendant has the right to 
compulsory process at state expense, Griffin v. People 
Of The State of Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 
L. Ed. 891 (1956); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 
87 S. Ct. 1920, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1967). However, that 
right is circumscribed by two prerequisites in that the 
defendant must show the materiality of the proposed 
witnesses's testimony, and he must give proof of in-
digence, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 (b); 18 
U. S. C. A.; Findley v. United States, 380 F. 2d 752 
(1967); United States v. Sprouse, 472 F. 2d 1167 (C. A. 
Tenn. 1973), cert, denied, 93 S. Ct. 2164, 411 U. S. 970, 
36 L. Ed. 2d 693. 
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The grant of compulsory process by the "Uniform 
Act" to obtain nonresident witnesses has uniformly been 
held to be at the discretion of the trial court: 
"It follows that it also is a reasonable inter-
pretation of the Act that discretion is placed in 
the trial judge to decide whether a certificate 
should issue. If the rule were otherwise, a de-
fendant, by claiming materiality of witnesses 
might make so many demands for their atten-
dance that expense and delay would seriously 
impede or prevent the administration of justice." 
State v. Smith, 458 P. 2d 687 (Or. App. 1969). 
See also State v. Mance, 7 Ariz. App. 269, 438 P. 2d 338 
(1968); State v. Schaffer, 70 Wash. 2d 124, 422 P. 2d 285 
(1966); People v. Nash, 36 111. 2d 275, 222 N. E. 2d 473 
(1967). 
The Utah Court has recognized the discretionary 
nature of the "Uniform Act" in State v. Leggroan, 15 
Utah 2d 153, 389 P. 2d 142 (1964): 
". . . the permissive tenor of the Act have 
led the courts, wherever the problem has arisen, 
almost unanimously to conclude that the Act, 
as to production of witnesses, may be helpful in 
a given case, permissive in nature, but not man-
datory" (Emphasis added.) 
The trial judge in this instance was not obligated to pro-
cure a defense witness at state expense without a show-
ing of both materiality and indigence. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS 
DISCRETIONARY POWER IN GRANTING 
A CERTIFICATE TO SECURE THE ATTEN-
DANCE OF A NONRESIDENT WITNESS, 
BUT DENYING FEES FOR THAT WIT-
NESS. 
Appellant argues that if the compulsory process of 
the "Uniform Act" is implemented for the defendant, 
the state is obligated to pay a witnesses' fees and mileage. 
Manifestly, the "Uniform Act" is not mandatory as to 
securing defense witnesses at state expense nor has the 
law evolved to demand such. Originally, the state denied 
any obligation to pay fees for defense witnesses, State 
v. Fouquette, supra, and this was despite the language 
of the "Uniform Act" which is seemingly mandatory. 
Today, it would appear that, abiding by constitutional 
standards, the State is only obligated to pay for defense 
witnesses when those witnesses are material and the de-
fendant is financially unable to procure them himself. 
The section of the "Uniform Act" which appellant 
relies upon, Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-14 (1953), as 
amended, does not provide a procedure for paying fees 
and mileage of defense witnesses, but is restricted to 
witnesses for the prosecution: 
"Whenever a judge of a court of record of 
this state shall issue a certificate under the pro-
visions of Section 77-45-73 to obtain the atten-
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dance of a witness for the prosecution from with-
out this state in a criminal prosecution . . ." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The appellant, in this instance, apparently pled facts 
which suggested that the witness might give some testi-
mony of probative value (R. 6), but he did not sup-
port, at least as far as the record shows, his naked allega-
tion that he was unable to pay costs. It would be well 
within the trial court's discretion to deny fees and mileage 
expenses where there was no showing of materiality of 
the testimony and indigence of the defendant to justify 
their payment at State expense. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that under the "Uniform Act" 
and constitutional law the state is required to pay for 
securing defense witnesses only under limited circum-
stances, and as it appears that appellant did not meet 
that criteria, his motion was properly denied. Respon-
dent prays that the Court affirm the lower court's order. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
M. REID RUSSELL 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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